

PYFET: Forensically Equivalent Transformation for Python Binary Decompilation

Ali Ahad^{*}, Chijung Jung^{*}, Ammar Askar[†], Doowon Kim[‡], Taesoo Kim[†], Yonghwi Kwon^{*}







Python Malware on the Rise

Growth of major programming languages

Based on Stack Overflow question views in World Bank high-income countries

Python malware is using a devious new technique By Sead Fadilpašić published December 19, 2022

Crooks are using new tricks to keep their payloads hidden

PyPI malware creators are starting to employ Anti-Debug techniques

By Andrey Polkovnychenko December 13, 2022 Ø 8 min read

SHARE: (f) (in) 🕑



The JFrog Security Research team continuously monitors popular open-source software (OSS) repositories with our automated tooling, and reports any vulnerabilities or malicious packages discovered to repository maintainers and the wider community.



Python Malware On The Rise

Cyborg Labs | July 14, 2020

serious malware over the past 30 years has been written in Assembly or such as C, C++, and Delphi. However, ever-increasing over the past decade, a ware has been written in interpreted languages, such as Python. The low barrier rapid development process, and massive library collection has made Python

Malicious Python Trojan Impersonates SentinelOne Security Client

A fully functional SentinelOne client is actually a Trojan horse that hides malicious code within; it was found lurking in the Python Package Index repository ecosystem.

Robert Lemos Contributing Writer, Dark Reading

December 19, 2022



2012

99

each month

of overall question views

3%

0%

Python Bytecode, Decompilers, and Failures

- Python malware is compiled to **Bytecode: Challenging** to **analyze**.
- Decompilers come to the rescue!
- But they **fail** on many binaries.





- 1. Asymmetric Warfare: Decompilers are easy to break but hard to fix.
 - Debugging decompilers requires substantial expertise and effort.





- 1. Asymmetric Warfare: Decompilers are easy to break but hard to fix.
 - Debugging decompilers requires substantial expertise and effort.





- **1.** Asymmetric Warfare: Decompilers are easy to break but hard to fix.
 - Debugging decompilers requires substantial expertise and effort.
- 2. Multiple decompilers: Not scalable to debug all.





- **1.** Asymmetric Warfare: Decompilers are easy to break but hard to fix.
 - Debugging decompilers requires substantial expertise and effort.
- 2. Multiple decompilers: Not scalable to debug all.







Identifying Decompilation Failure



Detecting a typical Decompilation failure

def main--- This code section failed: ---

0 LOAD GLOBAL

' instruction at offset 750 0

- Decompilation fails with error messages.
- Specifies approximate functions and offset of failure.

				10	L. 203		POP_EXCEPT
				11			JUMP_FORWARD
				12			END_FINALLY
	•			13		642_0	COME_FROM
	203:	636 POP_EXCEPT		14		642_1	COME_FROM
		638 JUMP_FORWARD (640 END FINALLY	to 642)	15			
	205.	- 642 LOAD FAST (self spread)	16	L. 205	642	LOAD_FAST
	205.	644 EXTENDED_ARG (512)	17			POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE
		646 POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE (648 LOAD_FAST (to 6/2) self_spread)			648	LOAD_FAST
		650 EXTENDED_ARG (512) deco	mpilation (fail)			POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE
11		654 LOAD_FAST (self_spread)				LOAD_FAST
12		658 POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE (to 672)	21			POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE
14 15		660 LOAD_FAST (662 EXTENDED ABG (self_spread) 512)	22			LOAD_FAST
16		664 POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE	to 672)	23			POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE
18		668 EXTENDED_ARG (512)	24			LOAD_FAST
19 20		670 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE (to 750)	25			POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE
21	206:	>> 672 SETUP_L(plicit Error De	acompilation			COME_FROM
23			plicit error. De				COME_FROM
24 25		>> 678 FOR_ITER 680 STORE_F/					COME_FROM
26 27	207.		ulure with an e	explicit error			COME_FROM
28	207.	684 LOAD_GL(
29 30		686 LOAD_COM 688 BINARY_					JUMP_BACK
31 32		690 LOAD_COM	messa	ge		748	POP_BLOCK
33		694 CALL_FUNCTION_KW (2 total positional and keyword args)				COME_FROM_LOOP
34 35		698 STORE_FAST	file)	34			COME_FROM
36 37	208:	700 LOAD FAST (file)	- 35			
38		702 LOAD_METHOD	read) A positional arguments)	36	Parse err	or at or	<pre>near `COME_FROM_L(</pre>
40		706 STORE_FAST (content)				

Decompilers also fail silently (Implicit Error)!

Decompiled successfully but generating a wrong code.



Original Program (Ground truth)

Decompiled Program

with Implicit Error (the 'else:' blocks)

Identifying (a few) Implicit Error Patterns



Correct Code Patterr if c1: s1 return s2	return under the wrong if.	<pre>Implicit Error if c1Patterns1return s2</pre>
<pre>if c1: if c2: s1 else: s2</pre>	else block wrongly coupled	<pre>if c1: if c2: s1 else: s2</pre>
try: s1 except: s2 s3	new 'else:' introduced	try: s1 except: s2 else: s3
<pre>for x in y: while c1: s1 s2 s3</pre>	while block removed, new 'else:' introduced.	<pre>for x in y: if c1: s1 else: s2 s3</pre>

Detecting: Implicit Errors with the Patterns





Detected 22,359 Implicit Errors from 5 Decompilers



Identifying Decompilation Failure







Fixing: Forensically Equivalent **Transformation** (FET)

- Forensically Equivalent Transformation
 - Careful extension of Semantically Equivalent Transformation
 - Preserving **forensically meaningful** semantics (manually defined)



Transformation

Forensically Equivalent Transformation

Fixing: (a few) Transformation Rules









Fixing: Iterative Transformation Process

- Based on Control Flow Graph of the program.
- Starting from the **detected/reported** error: e.g., **638: JUMP_FORWARD**





2. Extend targets: All directly reachable nodes from 638.

Extend targets: All directly reachable nodes from already covered nodes.

Explores only 33% of the nodes on average

Resolving Real-world Decompilation Failures

- 38,351 real-world malware samples from ReversingLab
- 17,117 (44.6%) malware samples failed to be decompile
 - Proportionally 3.9 (81%) failed most.
 - Followed by 3.8 (66%) and 3.7 (47%)



We **resolved** decompilation failures **of** <u>all</u> the malware samples (17,117)!

Case Study: Opcode Remapped & Obfuscated Binary



We resolve all! More detail in paper.

Summary

5

3

Malware binaries' decompilation errors resolve

Different Python Decompilers handled.

(Uncompyle6, Decompyle3, Uncompyle2, Uncompile3, Decompyle++)

Opcode remapping and **obfuscated** binaries handl (DropBox and druva)

30 Transformation rules developed.

