




RAIN: Refinable Attack Investigation with On-demand Inter-process Information Flow Tracking

Yang Ji, Sangho Lee, Evan Downing, Weiren Wang, Mattia Fazzini,
Taesoo Kim, Alessandro Orso, and Wenke Lee


ACM CCS 2017

Oct 31, 2017


More and more data breaches





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
Is attack investigation accurate?




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
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
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
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
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





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





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
Dependency confusion!






















Related work




Related work

- System-call-based
 - DTrace, Protracer, LSM, Hi-Fi




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
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
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
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 - Arnold




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


RAIN




RAIN

- We use
 - Record replay
 - Graph-based pruning
 - Selective DIFT



RAIN



- We use
 - Record replay
 - Graph-based pruning
 - Selective DIFT
- We achieve
 - High accuracy
 - Runtime efficiency
 - Highly improved analysis efficiency




Threat model

- Trusts the OS
 - RAIN tracks user-level attacks.
- Tracks explicit channels
 - Side or covert channel is out of scope.
- Records all attacks from their inception
 - Hardware trojans or OS backdoor is out of scope.



Architecture




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
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
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
Architecture



Architecture



Architecture



OS-level record replay

1. Records **external inputs**
2. Captures the **thread switching** from the pthread interface, not the produced **internal data**
3. Records ***system-wide*** executions


OS-level record replay

Thread 1




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
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
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
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
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
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Coarse-level logging and graph building

- Keeps logging system-call events
- Constructs a graph to represent:
 - the processes, files, and sockets as nodes
 - the events as causality edges

A: Attacker site
B: /docs/report.doc
C: /tmp/errors.zip

P1: /usr/bin/firefox

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
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
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
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- *Does every recorded execution need replay and DIFT?*

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Pruning

- *Does every recorded execution need replay and DIFT?* **No!**
- Prunes the data in the graph based on trigger analysis results
 - Upstream
 - Downstream
 - Point-to-point
 - Interference

Upstream

A: Attacker site

B: /docs/report.doc

C: /tmp/errors.zip

D: /docs/ctct1.csv

E: /docs/ctct2.pdf

F: /docs/loss.csv

P1: /usr/bin/firefox

P2: /usr/bin/TextEditor

P3: /bin/gzip

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
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F: /docs/loss.csv


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Upstream



Downstream



A: **Tampered file** /docs/ctct.csv

B: Seasonal report docs/s1.csv

C: Seasonal report docs/s2.csv

D: Budget report docs/bgt.csv


E: Half-year report docs/h2.pdf

P1: Spreadsheet editor

P2: Auto-budget program

P3: Auto-report program

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
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Point-to-point

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
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P4: Firefox browser

E

Point-to-point



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
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
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
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Interference

- Insight: only inbound and outbound files that interfere in a process will possibly produce causality.
 - We determine interference according to the time order of inbound and outbound IO events.


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
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
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
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
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

Interference

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
Interference

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Interference


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
Refinement - selective DIFT

- Replays and conducts DIFT to the necessary part of the execution
 - Aggregation
 - Upstream
 - Downstream
 - Point-to-point


Upstream refinement




Upstream refinement



Upstream refinement



Upstream refinement



Implementation summary


- RAIN is built on top of:
 - Arnold, the record replay framework
 - Dtracker (Libdft) and Dytan, the taint engines

Host	Module	LoC
Target host	Kernel module	2,200 C (Diff)
	Trace logistics	1,100 C
Analysis host	Provenance graph	6,800 C++
	Trigger/Pruning	1,100 Python
	Selective refinement	900 Python
	DIFT Pin tools	3,500 C/C++ (Diff)

Evaluations


- Runtime performance
- Accuracy
- Analysis cost
- Storage footprint

Runtime overhead: 3.22% SPEC CPU2006




Multi-thread runtime overhead: 5.35%


SPLASH-3



IO intensive application: less than 50%




High analysis accuracy




Scenarios from red team exercise of DARPA Transparent Computing program

Pruning effectiveness: ~94.2% reduction



Storage cost: ~4GB per day (1.5TB per year)



Discussion

- Limitations
 - RAIN trusts the OS that needs kernel integrity protection.
 - Over-tainting issue
- Direction
 - Hypervisor-based RAIN
 - Further reduce storage overhead

Conclusion

- RAIN adopts a multi-level provenance system to facilitate fine-grained analysis that enables accurate attack investigation.
- RAIN has low runtime overhead, as well as significantly improved analysis cost.